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Abstract
The value of a quality education in our society is unquestioned.
However, controversy exists concerning state efforts to insure education
for its citizens.
KEYWORDS: public, school, compulsory
Alternatives to Public School:
Florida's Compulsory Education Dilemma
A child is a person who is going to carry on what you have
started. . . . He will assume control of your cities, states and na-
tions. He is going to move in and take over your churches, schools,
universities and corporations. All your books are going to be judg-
ed, praised or condemned by him. The fate of humanity is in his
hands.1
Introduction
The value of a quality education in our society is unquestioned.
However, controversy exists concerning state efforts to insure education
for its citizens. These efforts are reflected in compulsory education
lawS2 which are sometimes challenged by citizens claiming compliance
through an unorthodox method of schooling.$
To set the stage for an analysis of Florida's contemporary
problems with compulsory school attendance laws, it is appropriate at
the outset to briefly discuss some landmarks which have been signifi-
cant in the origin and development of compulsory education in the
United States. The focus of this note will then shift to State of Florida
v. M.M.,4 a recent case involving education at home in the context of
1. Abraham Lincoln. This quote was taken from H.S. Bhola, A Policy Analysis
of Adult Literacy Versus Universal Primary Education, 55 VIEWPoINT TEACH AND
LEARN 22, 24 (Fall 1979).
2. See generally Note, Home Instruction: An Alternative to Institutional Educa-
tion, 18 J. FAM. LAW 353 (1980). All fifty states plus the District of Columbia have
compulsory attendance laws.
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Scoma v. Board of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill.
1974); People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953); F. & F. v. Duval
County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574,
90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980).
4. State of Fla. v. M.M., 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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Florida's compulsory school attendance laws. The examination of M.M.
will be highlighted by the court's struggle to define the word "school"
and followed by an analysis of the potential ramifications of the court's
decision. Although the court displayed wisdom in reaching its decision,
there remains a legislative void in Florida which is susceptible to future
challenge; some recommendations are suggested which can help to fill
that gap and clarify Florida's ambiguous compulsory education laws.
Historical Perspective of Compulsory Education
In 1925 the United States Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters5 recognized the need to balance state power to insure the
education of its populace with parental rights to direct their children's
upbringing. Pierce involved a challenge to an Oregon enactment which
required "every parent, guardian or other person.having control. . . of
a child between eight and sixteen years to send him to a public
school."8 The Court considered the enactment "repugnant to the con-
stitution" because the legitimate business and property interests of pri-
vate schools were "threatened with destruction through the unwar-
ranted compulsion which [the state exercised] over present and
prospective patrons of their schools." Pierce is frequently cited for its
dictum acknowledging the parental option to elect private school for
their children. This option is a derivative of the parental right to be
free from unreasonable governmental interference with respect to their
children's upbringing. 8 Although the parents' right to provide private
education prevailed, along with the private schools' business and prop-
erty interests, the Court cautioned
[n]o question [was] raised concerning the power of the state rea-
sonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine
them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
5. 268 U.S. 510.
6. Id.,at 530 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 532, 535.
8. Id. at 534-35 citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) which stated
that legislation prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to students prior to pass-
ing the eighth grade was an unreasonable interference with the right of parents to
control the education of their children.
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proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly es-
sential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.9
Thus, Pierce may be equally significant for its implicit recognition of
the state's power to compel and regulate education of its citizens so
long as the power is reasonably exercised.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position regarding state power
to reasonably regulate education in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' ° but the Court
also recognized that notwithstanding the high priority on education, the
state's interest "is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordina-
tion of all other interests."'11 In Yoder, Amish parents claimed that the
compulsory education law in Wisconsin was inapplicable to them be-
cause it conflicted with their religious beliefs which are protected by
the free exercise clause of the first amendment."2 The Wisconsin law,
which required public or private school attendance between the ages of
seven and sixteen, was contrary to the parents' religious practices
prohibiting formal education beyond the eighth grade.' 3 This prohibi-
tion is rooted in the Amish doctrine which emphasizes that "salvation
requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world
and worldly influence.' 4 Apparently, the Amish community feared
that formal education beyond the eighth grade "not only expose[d]
themselves to. . . censure of the church community. . . but. . . also
endanger[ed] their own salvation . . ." due to the intensity of peer
pressures coercing conformity to non-Amish values.' 5 The Court,
clearly influenced by the longstanding practice of the Amish religion
9. Id. at 534.
10. 406 U.S. at 213. The court was emphatic in their position by stating: "There
is no doubt as to the power of a state, having a high responsibility for education of its
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic educa-
tion." Id. (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 215.
12. Id. at 208-09. The court quoted from the first amendment in footnote four of
the opinion: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." Id. at 209 n.4.
13. Id. at 211.
14. Id. at 210.
15. Id. at 209-11.
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coupled with the history of self-reliance demonstrated by its followers,
agreed that enforcement of the Wisconsin compulsory education law
would threaten the existence of the Amish religion. 6 It is important to
realize, however, that the Yoder holding is narrow and the Amish par-
ents may have been unsuccessful if their departure from the compul-
sory education laws had been more substantial" or if their beliefs had
not been grounded in a religious foundation. s
Presently, compulsory education laws generally require children to
attend school between the ages of six to sixteen.19 Although this age
requirement varies only slightly from state to state, there is great dis-
parity between state statutes regarding the means of achieving compul-
sory attendance.20 This lack of statutory uniformity, combined with
conflicting judicial decisions, brings into focus the competing interests
that often collide in compulsory attendance controversies. These inter-
ests are those of the state in mandating and regulating the education of
its citizens, the parents in directing the upbringing of their children,
and the child in being guaranteed educational opportunities.2 1, It is evi-
dent that these interests must be carefully weighed if a compulsory ed-
16. Id. at 219, 224-25. While there was no evidence concerning the attrition rate
in the Amish religion, the Court seemed confident that Amish defectors were not likely
to become burdens on society. Id. at 224-25.
17. Id. at 238 (concurring opinion). Justice White explained why Yoder should
have limited application: "This would be a very different case for me if respondent's
claim were that their religion forbade their children from attending any school at any
time and from complying in any way with the educational standards set by the state."
Id. The Court also seemed impressed with the quality of vocational training provided
for the children in lieu of the brief additional period of formal education. Id. at 224.
18. Id. at 216. Chief Justice Burger who delivered the opinion of the court re-
stricted Yoder to claims based on religious beliefs. He hypothesized:
If the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his times and isolated him-
self at Walden. Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis.
Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious and
such belief does not rise to the demands of the religion clauses.
Id. Compar; F. & F., 273 So. 2d 15, discussed in the Ramifications section of this note.
19. Moberly, Compulsory Attendance-A Second Look, THE HIGH SCHOOL J.,
Feb. 1980, at 197; Note, supra note 2, at 357.
20. Id. at 379-81; See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3d 1222 (1975).
21. 406 U.S. at 213-15. See also 268 U.S. at 534-35.
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ucation dispute is to reach a just resolution.
The state's interests in an educated citizenry was stressed early in
our country's history by Thomas Jefferson who believed that education
is a cornerstone of democracy 22 and it is evident that the state is inter-
ested in preparing citizens to become "self-sufficent participants in soci-
ety." 23 Parental interest in the nurture and education of their children
is incontrovertible and to override the parent, a state interest of suffi-
cient magnitude must exist.24 When the parental interest is religiously
based, the state's concern must be compelling before the courts will
allow intervention, as clearly demonstrated by the Yoder decision.25
The interest of the child is obviously the heart of the controversy and
should never be overlooked in the balancing process. Justice Douglas in
his dissenting opinion in Yoder, wrote: "Children themselves have con-
stitutionally protectible interests," 26 and he believed that the Yoder
majority ignored the interests of the child in reaching its decision.
Douglas eloquently stated: "The education of the child is a matter on
which the child will often have decided views. . . he may want to be a
pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer . . if his education is
truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.12 7
Today the controversies continue. In recent years parental dissatis-
faction with public schools has manifested in an increased number of
22. 406 U.S. at 221, 225. See also Moberly, supra note 18 which quoted a force-
ful statement made by Thomas Jefferson in 1816: "If a nation expects to be ignorant
and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be ... "
Id. at 196.
23. 406 U.S. at 221.
24. Id. at 214, 232. See also 391 F. Supp. at 460-61. In Scoma, the parents
asserted fundamental constitutional rights to educate their children as they saw fit and
the court held that those interests do not "rise above a personal or philosophical choice
and cannot claim to be within the bounds of constitutional protection. Id. But see Ohio
v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181 at , 351 N.E.2d 750 at 771 (1976). Ohio's minimum
standards for private schools were so pervasive they nearly cloned the private schools in
the public school image which consequently deprived the parents of their traditional
interests in guiding their children's upbringing. Id. at , 351 N.E.2d at 768.
25. 406 U.S. at 214; 294 N.W.2d at 895; See also 47 Ohio St. 2d at ._, 351
N.E.2d at 771; But cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) which explained
that the power of the parent, even when related to a religious claim may be subject to
limitations when it endangers the welfare of the child.
26. 406 U.S. at 242-44.
27. Id. at 244-46.
2731
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parents attempting to educate their children at home. There is evidence
of this movement in Broward County, Florida, as demonstrated by the
establishment of the United Citizens of Broward, a parent group
bonded together by their interest in home schooling. "[A]lthough ac-
curate figures are difficult to come by. . .John Holt . . publisher of
Growing without Schooling, a newsletter for home schoolers, estimates
that upwards of 10,000 families" have established home schools
nationwide. s
Dissatisfaction with the public school system frequently stems
from school boundary disputes and busing requirements. Certainly
many parents are concerned for their children's welfare due to exces-
sively long bus rides to school at unbelievably inconvenient hours,29 but
it is significant to note the fact that many other parents are insidiously
motivated by racial prejudice. Skepticism regarding the quality of edu-
cation provided in the public schools also seems to be increasing in re-
cent years, along with concerns about school violence and what some
believe to be a "mean spirited, competitive, status oriented"30 atmo-
sphere. As a former teacher, guidance counselor and coach in the Flor-
ida public school systems ' I question whether these concerns are justi-
fied or exaggerated. Even if they are well founded, it can be argued
that the school atmosphere is merely a reflection of the society in which
children must learn to function.32 Certainly parents are entitled to be
critical of the education afforded their children. However, regardless of
parental motivations for withdrawing children from the public schools,
parents should not be exempt from fulfilling their responsibility to com-
ply in an acceptable manner with the state's compulsory education
requirements.
Home instruction is recognized in many states as an alternative
28. R. A. Bumstead, Educating Your Child at Home: The Perchemlides Case,
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Oct. 1979, at 98. Holt has predicted that "[w]ithin a decade half
a million U.S. families will be educating their children at home." V. Rustand, Home
Teaching and Herbert, 58 EDUCATIONAL HORIZONs 75, 75 (Winter 1979).
29. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
30. R.A. Bumstead, supra note 27.
31. Dade County: 1972-1975, Collier County: 1976-1977, Broward County:
1977- 1980.
32. R.A. Bumstead, supra note 27.
1 274 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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means of compliance with compulsory education laws.3 3 In those states
permitting education at home, it is not unusual for one or more of the
following to be required: (a) certain courses to be included,3 4 (b) certi-
fied or qualified instructors,3 5 (c) instruction equivalent to that availa-
ble in public schools 6 or (d) instruction for a specified length of time."
Florida is among those states which statutorily provide for the home
education alternative as a means of compliance with compulsory school
attendance so long as the child is tutored by a certified instructor.3 8
Recently, however, a case of first impression arose in the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal of Florida which provided occasion to review a
circuit court determination that parents who are not certified teachers
may be permitted to educate their children at home. 9
State of Florida v. M.M.
When the 1981-82 Broward County School boundaries were re-
established, Mr. and Mrs. Pohl objected to the continued busing of
their two children to Ely High School in Pompano, Florida.40 After the
Pohls were denied a transfer for their children by the Hardship Com-
mittee of the School Board, they decided to withdraw them from public
school.41 The Pohls removed Scott and Michelle from Ely High School
in February 1981 and commenced instruction in their own home which
they designated as the Pohl Private School.42 The two children were the
only pupils and neither of the parents were certified teachers nor was
an older sister who also instructed the children on occasion. 43 The Stu-
33. See Note, supra note 1, at 379-81.
34. In Re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961). Accord, e.g.,
State v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963).
35. E.g., State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (1981).
See Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979).
36. State of N.J. v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County
Ct. 1967); State v. Hershberger 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955).
37. FLA. STAT. § § 228.041 (13) and (16) (Supp. 1980).
38. FLA. STAT. § 232.02 (4) (1979).
39. 407 So. 2d at 989-90.
40. In the Interests of Michelle Martin and Scott Evans, Nos. 81-2550 and 81-
2552. (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., ordered June 30, 1981). Hereinafter cited as Court Order.
41. Id.
42. Id., 407 So. 2d at 989.
43. 407 So. 2d at 990.
2751
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dent Welfare and Attendance Department of the School Board initi-
ated an action for dependency44 in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit al-
leging that the children had been truant from Ely High School in
violation of the Florida Compulsory Education Law which mandates
regular school attendance between the ages of six and sixteen.4 5 Com-
pliance with Florida's compulsory education law can be accomplished
in four alternative ways according to Florida Statute Section 232.02.46
Regular school attendance is the actual attendance of the pupil
during the school day as defined by law and regulations of the
State Board. Regular attendance within the intent of 232.01 may
be achieved by attendance at:
(1) A public school supported by public funds;
(2) A parochial or denominational school;
(3) A private school supported in whole or in part by tuition
charges or by endowments or gifts;
(4) At home with a private tutor who meets all requirements pre-
scribed by law and regulations of the State Board of Private
Tutors.
Although the fourth alternative allows home instruction under the
guidance of a private tutor,47 the Pohls did not claim compliance under
that provision because a teaching certificate is a pre-requisite for pri-
vate tutors.48 Asserting, instead, that their home was a private school,
the Pohls claimed compliance with the third provision which does not
explicitly mandate certification of instructors. 49 The state argued that
the Pohl teaching arrangement was similar to the private tutoring rela-
tionship contemplated in Section 232.01 (4) and, consequently, the in-
structors were required to be certified.50 Circuit Court Judge Vitale
44. Id. and FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9)(d) (Supp. 1980).
45. FLA. STAT. § 232.01 (Supp. 1980).
46. FLA. STAT. § 232.02 (1979).
47. FLA. STAT. § 232.02(4) (1979).
48. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. Admin. Rule 6A-1.951 reads in part: "Private
Tutors. Any person who tutors a child of compulsory attendance age, when such tutor-
ing is in lieu of school attendance for the child, shall meet the following requirements:
(1) He shall hold a valid Florida certificate to teach the subject or grades in which
instruction is given."
49. Petitioners Brief at 1-2; Court Order at 1.
50. Petitioners Brief at 2.
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held that the arrangement constituted a private school and therefore
the teacher certification requirement did not apply because "[t]here are
currently no rules or statutes regulating non-public schools in the areas
of certification or education of teachers, curriculum, class loads, stu-
dent assessment and many other areas. ... 51 To comply with the pri-
vate school provision, the Pohls were required merely to: (a) maintain
enrollment and attendance records,5 2 (b) obtain certificates of immuni-
zation for their children, 53 (c) instruct the children for the requisite
number of hours per day and days per year5 and (d) file an annual
data base survey with the Department of Education. 5
The court determined that the Pohls were not strictly in compli-
ance with the Florida Statute because Scott and Michelle were in-
structed only four hours per day rather than the five hours mandated
by law.56 Notwithstanding this deficiency, it was ordered that the chil-
dren could attend the Pohl Private School and the matter was sched-
uled to be reviewed at a later date to allow the Pohls an opportunity to
enlarge their instructional hours.57
The state petitioned the Fourth District Court of Appeal and the
oral argument focused on a frustrating effort to define "school." 58 If
the Pohl home instruction scheme had constituted a school, then it
would have been difficult to deny compliance with the private school
provision in the Florida statute.59 If the program had been merely a
tutoring arrangement, then the private school provision could not have
sheltered the Pohls from the teacher certification requirements applica-
ble to private tutors under the home instruction provision. 0
Florida's statute provides virtually no aid in defining the word
"school." The state relied on the definition of "school" provided in
51. Court Order at 2. (emphasis added). Judge Vitale noted that "Florida Stat-
ute Chapter 247 which set minimum standards for private schools was repealed in
1969." Id. Interestingly, compliance with those standards was never mandatory.
52. FLA. STAT. § 232.021 (1979); Court Order at 2.
53. FLA. STAT. § 232.032 (Supp. 1980). Court Order at 2.
54. FLA. STAT. § § 228.041 (13) and (16) (Supp. 1980). Court Order at 2.
55. FLA. STAT. § 229.808 (1979). Court Order at 3.
56. Court Order at 2.
57. Id. at 4.
58. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
59. FLA. STAT. § 232.02( )f(1979).
60. FLA. STAT. § 232.02(4) (1979).
2771
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Florida Statute Section #228.041 (5): "A school is an organization of
pupils for instructional purposes on an elementary, secondary or other
public school level approved under regulations of the State Board." 1
The problem with this definition, according to the Pohls, is that since it
is found in Chapter 228 of the Florida Statutes entitled State Plan for
Public Education it applies only to public education.62 The Pohls,
therefore, asserted that the proper definition of school is derived from
Florida Statute 229.808 (2) which "defines a non-public school as one
which could be run by an individual"63 and "declares itself to be an
educational center."'" The difficulty with this definition is that its ap-
plication is expressly limited to organization of the data base survey, a
report facilitating maintenance of state records of all private schools in
Florida.6 5 This struggle to define the word "school" commanded the
appellate court's attention and ultimately influenced the court to re-
verse "the final order under review in all respects save the adjudication
that the minor appellees are dependent children within the jurisdiction
of the family division of the circuit court." 66
Can A Home Be A School?
Several jurisdictions have struggled to define a "school" for pur-
poses of determining compliance with compulsory education laws.67
Their experience provides a valuable context for analyzing the Fourth
District Court of Appeal's rationale in M.M.
Generally, two contrasting positions have emerged reflecting dif-
ferent viewpoints concerning the functions that schools should fulfill."
The first position defines a school as an organization or institution in
61. Petitioners Brief at 3. The petitioners view was consistent with a 1972 Attor-
ney General opinion which recommended use of this definition to determine whether
attendance at a private school can satisfy the regular attendance requirement. 072-90
Op. Att'y Gen 154, 156 (1972).
62. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
63. Respondent's Brief at 3.
64. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
65. Id., Fla. Stat. § 229.808(2) (1979).
66. 407 So. 2d at 991.
67. See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1975).
68. Id. at 1232-34; Accord Note, supra note 2, at 364-65.
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the business of education. 69 Cases advocating this position often recog-
nize the importance of group learning activities and school socialization
functions.70 The second position considers an arrangement to be a
school if learning is imparted, regardless of the number of students
involved. 71 This view focuses solely on academic functions and denies
69. See State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929) where it was held that
parents cannot "make use of units of education so small, or facilities of such doubtful
quality, that supervision thereof would impose an unreasonable burden upon the state
.... " Id. at 41, 146 A. at 171. Accord City of Akron v. Lane, 65 Ohio App. 2d 90,
416 N.E.2d 642 (1979). State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 P. 910 (1912) is often
cited to support the proposition that home instruction by parents is not a private school.
See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 4. Judge Morris wrote a perplexing opinion in the Cou-
nort case. On one hand he stated that instruction by a parent to a child regardless of
the parents competency to teach is not attendance at a private school. 69 Wash. at .
124 P. at 911. To constitute a private school "means the same character of school as
the public school, a regular, organized and existing institution, making a business of
instructing children . . . ." Id. at -, 124 P. at 911-12. On the other hand it seemed
contradictory when he stated, "[u]ndoubtedly a private school may be maintained in a
private home in which the children of the instructor may be pupils. This . . . is not to
be determined by the place where the school is maintained, nor the individuality or
number of the pupils who attend it. It is to be determined by the purpose, intent, and
character of the endeavor." Id. at ., 124 P. at 912. The decision, denying private
school status to the Counort arrangement seemed to turn on the state's evidence "that
his two little girls could be seen playing about the house at all times during the ordi-
nary school hours." Id.
70. 195 Cal. App. 2d at -, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 171; Knox v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super.
608, 72 A.2d 389 (Cape May County Ct. 1950). Knox was subsequently overruled by
Massa which interpreted equivalent instruction merely to be academic equivalency and
denied consideration of socialization factors. 95 N.J. Super. at _, 231 A.2d at 257.
71. 404 I11. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213. The court, in Levisen agreed with the parents
and held that "[a] school . . . is a place where instruction is imparted to the young
. . . [and the] number of persons taught does not determine whether the place is a
school." Id. at -, 90 N.E.2d at 215. The court reasoned that the end result is determi-
native rather than the manner in which the education is delivered. Id. See generally
Comment, Private Tutoring, Compulsory Education and the Illinois Supreme Court,
18 U. Cm. L. REv. 105 (1950). See also State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E.
550 (1904). In Peterman, the parent who hired a teacher to instruct his child at the
teacher's home was in compliance with the law because "[t]his would be the school of
the child. . . and would be as much a private school as if. . . conducted as such." Id.
at .., 70 N.E. at 551. Compare 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962. The Lowry court held
that the home instruction did not constitute a private school but also implied that the
result may have been the opposite if the legislature's course of study requirements had
been complied with by the parents. Id. at , 383 P.2d at 965. See State v. Superior Ct.,
279 I1
11
Sherman: Alternatives to Public School: Florida's Compulsory Education Dil
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
280 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
the importance of socialization at school. 2 While both theories re-
present accepted descriptions of schools, distinctive ramifications are
associated with each perspective. In terms of M.M., if the first theory
had been adopted by the appellate court, the Pohls would have had
difficulty demonstrating their instructional arrangement was an organi-
zation in the business of education.7 8 If the second theory had been
embraced, then the court may have considered the Pohls' arrangement
a private school because it imparted learning despite the apparent lack
of socialization. 4
In People v. Turnere5 a California appellate court construed a
statute which, like Florida's, provided a home instruction exemption to
state compulsory education laws. The Turner court held that when
children were tutored at home, parents were not entitled to use the
private school provision.7 6 Reading the statute's sections in pari
materia the court concluded "the legislature intended to distinguish be-
tween private schools upon the one hand and home instruction by a
private tutor . . . on the other. 77
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in M.M. adopted the Turner
reasoning, concluding "[that there is no statutory authority regulating
the establishment of private schools in Florida does not mean that Flor-
ida parents, unqualified to be private tutors, can proclaim their homes
to be private schools and withdraw their offspring from public
schools."'7 8 The M.M. court applied the following canon of statutory
construction to section 232.02 in support of its conclusion:
55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959). The Washington Supreme Court established
"three essential elements of a school ... (1) the teacher, (2) the pupil or pupils, and
(3) the place or institution." Id. at ._, 346 P.2d at 1002. Washington law required all
teachers to be certified and teacher certification appeared to be the only ingredient
preventing the home instruction from being a school. Id.
72. 95 N.J. Super. at -, 231 A.2d at 257.
73. 69 Wash. at -, 124 P. at 911-12.
74. 404 Ill. at -, 90 N.E.2d at 215.
75. 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953).
76. Id. at _, 263 P.2d at 688.
77. Id. Judge Patrosso stated, "[i]f a private school ... necessarily comprehends
a parent or private tutor instructing at home, there was no necessity to make specific
provision exempting the latter." Id.
78. 407 So. 2d at 990.
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In the interpretation of a statute, it will be presumed that the
legislature intended every part thereof for a purpose, and that it
had some purpose in introducing the particular language used in an
enactment. The maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pereat" requires
not merely that the statute should be given effect as a whole, but
that effect should be given to each of its provisions. Significance
and effect should be accorded every part of the statute, if this can
be done without destroying or perverting the sense or effect of the
law or the general policy that dictated its enactment. In general,
therefore, that construction is favored which gives effect to every
clause and every part of the statute, thus producing a consistent
and harmonious whole. A construction that would leave without
effect any part of the language used should be rejected if possible.79
To allow the private school designation to be attached to the Pohl home
tutoring arrangement would have ignored this rule of statutory con-
struction and obviously rendered Florida's home instruction provision
mere surplusage.80
Ramifications
It is possible that the Pohls' home instruction would have fur-
nished the children an adequate education; it is even conceivable that
the children's education would be superior to that afforded by public
schools. However, it is important to consider that the purpose of the
compulsory education statute is to insure all children receive a satisfac-
tory education. If parents are permitted to claim compliance with the
private school provision while instructing children at home, then many
children may be deprived of educational opportunities due to the
idiosyncrasies of their parents.81 For example, in F. & F. v. Duval
79. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
80. State of Fla. v. M.M.--oral argument tapes. To paraphrase one of the judges
from the M.M. oral argument, if we were to adopt the position that home tutoring
constitutes a private school then why wouldn't a private tutor simply declare the ar-
rangement to be a school. (The judge was candidly suggesting that this would nullify
the requirement in Florida that private tutors obtain teaching certificates.) Accord Pe-
titioner's Brief at 5.
81. See 406 U.S. 205 (dissenting opinion); 391 F. Supp. 452; 404 Ill. 574, 90
N.E.2d 213 (dissenting opinion). In Levisen, Justice Simpson was concerned the law
may "be thwarted by the whim and caprice of the many who... will take advantage
281 1
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County 2 parents instructing their children at home asserted that it was
against their religious beliefs to send the children to school; they
claimed compliance with the parochial school provision of Florida's
statute.83 The father, a self-ordained minister of the so-called "Cove-
nant Church of Jesus Christ," believed that it was sinful to associate
with Blacks and Orientals because they were the product of Eve's copu-
lation with Satan.84 The court found the parents not in compliance with
the parochial school provision because the religion had not been recog-
nized; this was supported by the fact that no church services were held
for other people.8 5 This distinction is significant when comparing
F. & F. to Yoder. Even though both cases ostensibly involve religious
practice, only in Yoder was the claim legitimately grounded in the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment. In cases not legitimately based
on the free exercise clause, however, there is no guarantee that an ex-
emption from state law will be granted.88 There is an "ancient
Rabbinic principle first laid down by the Babylonian Jewish Scholar
Samuel, and known as dina de-malkhuta dina, . .. the law of the
country is binding and in certain cases is to be preferred. 8s7 This prin-
ciple describes the course taken by United States courts, which recog-
nize one's right to hold any belief; but when those beliefs lead to prac-
tices interfering with the rights or welfare of others, the courts support
the state's authority to intervene. 88
The F. & F. court found it unnecessary to consider whether the
instructional arrangement could be a private school because the parents
only claimed compliance with Florida's school attendance law as a
home tutoring arrangement and a parochial school.89 This is important
because a decision sanctioning the Pohl Private School in M.M. would
have established a dangerous precedent enabling bizarre situations, as
of the situation. . . ." Id. at -, 90 N.E.2d at 216.
82. 273 So. 2d 15.
83. Id. at 17-18.
84. Id. at 18.
85. Id.
86. State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966).
87. State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802 at -, 301 N.W.2d 571 at 581
(1981) (concurring opinion).
88. 197 Kan. 567 at -, 419 P.2d 896 at 901; 294 N.W.2d at 888.
89. 273 So. 2d at 17-18.
1282 6:1982Nova Law Journal
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illustrated by F. & F., to achieve compliance with Florida's private
school provision. Moreover, judicial endorsement of such a policy would
have undoubtedly resulted in a deluge of public school withdrawals.
Many parents, like the Pohls, who are disgruntled with school busing
could have used this precedent to thwart school board efforts to effectu-
ate racial integration. Similarly, whenever school policy disputes arise,
withdrawals would be encouraged without concomitant assurances that
parent-furnished educational alternatives are adequate. In M.M. the
court adopted a common sense approach recognizing that the Pohl Pri-
vate School does not fit within the generally accepted meaning of
"school."
It is this author's view that the M.M. court, by adhering to the
teacher certification requirements of the home instruction provision in
Florida's statute, wisely avoided opening the proverbial floodgates. Un-
fortunately, the decision did not fill the void in Florida's compulsory
education statute by precisely prescribing the characteristics necessary
for an instructional arrangement to be considered a school for purposes
of the private school provision. This clearly would have usurped the
legislature's power; thus the court elected not to intrude into the legis-
lature's domain. The decision seems narrowly restricted to the facts of
the case and it is unclear what result will follow when parents assert
private school status by commencing instruction in a clubhouse, garage
or storefront with an expanded number of pupils. The question is likely
to be presented in the near future since "[s]chool officials [in Broward
County] [estimate] that parents of about 30 to 40 students have been
following the Pohls' example of keeping their children home or in
makeshift private schools to protest busing." 90
What are the minimum characteristics necessary for an educa-
tional facility to be considered a private school? Consider the present
arrangement of a Broward County storefront school, housed in Bay X
of the North Lauderdale Square Shopping Center. It is called The
North Lauderdale Academy and it may very well become the next bat-
tleground in the compulsory education arena.9 1 This arrangement was
90. Miami Herald, Dec. 17, 1981 § A at 1, col. 1. The "director of student wel-
fare and attendance, said truant officers have found about 60 children this year who are
being taught at home by parents." Fort Lauderdale News, Dec. 17, 1981 § B at 1, col.
5.
91. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
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born from the same busing controversy as the Pohl Private School and
after an unsuccessful first attempt, the storefront school has been oper-
ating for several weeks.92 The curriculum is provided by the University
of Nebraska's High School Independent Study Program. 93 Although
student enrollment has fluctuated, there are presently fifteen pupils at-
tending the Academy with expectations of additional students in the
future.94 The program's supervisors are not certified teachers in the
State of Florida although two of them have experience in education
and one holds an out-of-state expired teaching certificate.95 Under the
University of Nebraska's independent study program, however,
"[s]upervisors are not teachers of courses offered through the Indepen-
dent Study High School, and to serve effectively, need not have the
background to help students with the subject matter in the courses.""
The local supervisors are merely monitors or administrators and pri-
mary instruction is provided by correspondence with teachers at the
University of Nebraska.97
Don Samuels, a member of the Broward County School Board,
has argued that the North Lauderdale Academy "[i]n the long run,
.. . will hurt the kids."98 Development of social skills may be ham-
pered if these children are deprived of the opportunity to interact and
mature with their peer group.9 9 Due partially to the school's infancy
and also to the nature of the endeavor, the facilities and equipment are
below par. Yet, while social interaction and adequate facilities are de-
sirable, they are presently of little consequence in determining compli-
92. Id. at 2B; Personal Interview with North Lauderdale Academy supervisor,
Penny Kaufman.
93. University of Nebraska-Lincoln Division of Continuing Studies. Independent
Study High School Bulletin Series 82, No. 10 (1981-82).
94. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
95. Personal interview with North Lauderdale Academy supervisor Penny
Kaufman.
96. University of Nebraska-Lincoln Division of Continuing Studies, supra note
93, at 6.
97. Id. at 6-7.
98. Miami News, Dec. 15, 1981 § B (Lifestyle), at 1-2, col. 2.
99. Id. Jim Augustyn, the interim Principal at the University of Nebraska's In-
dependent High School Program admits "they'll have to pick up their socialization
skills on the outside somewhere, and there won't be the spontaneous give and take
between teacher and pupil that you'd see in a normal school." Id.
1284 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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ance with Florida's statute.100 Other questions are presented by the
establishment of the North Lauderdale Academy. First, does this
arrangement fall within the private school provision which does not
mandate teaching credentials, or under the home education provision
subject to teacher certification requirements? Second, are state certifi-
cation requirements complied with when children are enrolled in corre-
spondence courses similar to the University of Nebraska Independent
Study Program? These questions have not yet been litigated in Florida
and it is urgent for the legislature to address the issues during the pre-
sent session.
Recommendations
M.M. has pointed out alarming shortcomings in Florida's compul-
sory education statute. There are virtually no minimum standards as-
suring citizens of Florida that the quality of education at private
schools will be acceptable.101 Furthermore, founders of new private
schools appear uncertain of what minimum standards should be
achieved to comply with Florida's private school provisions.102 It is true
that many private schools maintain high standards, but at the same
time it is possible that some private schools are substandard and detri-
mental to student welfare. Understandably, regulations imposing all
public school standards upon the private schools are unreasonable be-
cause the distinctiveness of private schools would become blurred.10 3 It
is also recognized that any possibility of mass state indoctrination of
our youth through the schools should be avoided. However, as stated
earlier, the right of the state to reasonably regulate education is un-
questioned104 and adoption of minimum standards would upgrade or
100. The Florida Statutes make no mention of social interaction or facilities with
reference to private educational programs.
101. Court Order at 3.
102. Interview with North Lauderdale Academy supervisor Penny Kaufman.
103. 47 Ohio St. 2d at -, 351 N.E.2d at 768. Accord 589 S.W.2d 877. "[T]o say
one may not be compelled to send a child to a public school but the state may deter-
mine the basic texts to be used in the private . .-. schools is but to require that the
same hay be fed in the field as is fed in the barn." Id. at 884.
104. 406 U.S. at 213; Accord Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). "A
state always has a legitimate concern for maintaining standards in all schools it allows
to operate." Id. at 613. But cf. 589 S.W.2d at 883 n.9. "State controlled homogeneous
285116:1982
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eliminate the substandard private schools without burdening those
schools already maintaining acceptable standards.
Both the circuit court and the Pohls claimed the legislature in-
tended not to regulate or control non-public schools. 0 5 The legislature,
however, did not intend to prohibit all regulations as illustrated by state
requirements concerning the number of mandatory school days and
hours for compliance with compulsory attendance laws.106 This is also
substantiated by the standards established for non-public colleges and
all independent post-secondary vocational, technical, trade and business
schools. 10 7 These standards exist to "protect" the student from decep-
tive, fraudulent or substandard education.10 8 They are not "intended to
regulate the stated purpose of a nonpublic college [or post-secondary
school] or to restrict any religious instruction or training in a nonpublic
college [or post-secondary school]."109 It is difficult to understand why
students in private elementary or secondary schools are not in need of
the same protections provided students in private colleges or post-secon-
dary schools.
It is time to establish minimum standards for all schools in Flor-
ida, and teacher certification should be one of the first requirements
adopted. To this former teacher it is incredible that presently there is
no certification requirement for those teaching in private schools. Al-
though it has been argued that certification will not guarantee the com-
petency of teachers, it will certainly provide one way to increase the
likelihood that teachers are qualified to instruct our children."x0
To become a certified teacher in Florida, one must have earned a
four-year college degree which includes an emphasis on professional
preparation in teaching."" In addition, the Department of Education
schools have provided a fertile field for the growth of totalitarian governments." Id.
105. Court Order at 3. State v. M.M.-oral argument tapes.
106. FLA. STAT. § § 228.041 (13) and (16) (Supp. 1980).
107. FLA. STAT. § 246.011 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. § 246.201 (1979).
108. FLA. STAT. § 246.011(3) (Supp. 1980).
109. FLA. STAT. § 246.011(4) (Supp. 1980).
110. 294 N.W.2d at 894.
111. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. Admin. Rule 6A-4.04 reads in part:
(2) Regular Certificate. The regular certificate shall be valid for 5 years
and may be issued to an applicant who has met the following
requirements:
(b) Holds an earned acceptable four-year bachelor's or higher
18
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requires new teacher-applicants to demonstrate specific competencies
by means of a written examination. 1 2 The teacher must be competent
to write in understandable style, interpret professional material, under-
stand basic mathematics and comprehend patterns of child develop-
ment. 113 These qualifications are essential if Florida is to achieve a sat-
isfactory standard of education. Finally, the state should also adopt
minimum curriculum requirements insuring students in all schools that
they will be instructed in those fundamental areas needed for function-
ing in society. 14
degree or a foreign degree that required twelve (12) years of
pre-university education combined with four (4) years of
higher education ...
(c) Has an acceptable major in a single certification subject
• ..or has met the specialization and professional preparation
requirements for that subject ...
112. Fla. State Bd. of Educ. Admin. Rule 6A-4.021 reads in part:
Florida Teachers Certification written examination.
(2) Examination required.
(a) Each applicant who applies for a full-time Florida teaching certificate
and who does not currently hold a valid regular certificate in the State of
Florida shall be required to present a passing score on each sub-test of the
Florida Teaching Certificate Examination ...
(3) Description; competencies.
(c) The following competencies are to be demonstrated by means of the
written examination;
1. The ability to write in a logical and understandable style
with appropriate grammar and sentence structure.
2. The ability to read, comprehend, and interpret professional
and other written material.
3. The ability to comprehend and work with fundamental
mathematical concepts.
4. The ability to comprehend patterns or physical, social and
academic development in students, and to counsel students
concerning their needs in those areas.
113. Id.
114. State of Fla. v. M.M.-oral argument tapes. The necessity for minimum cur-
riculum requirements was apparent from part of the dialogue which occurred at the
M.M. oral argument.
Judge: "Supposing the Pohls are illiterate, does that make any difference?
Attorney: "No Sir, not according to the law as we find it now."
Judge: "If all they do for 5 hours a day is teach tennis, does that make any
difference?"
2871Florida's Compulsory Education Dilemma16:1982
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Conclusion
M.M. has revealed serious defects in Florida's compulsory educa-
tion laws. If the Florida legislature "dropped the ball,' 115 it is time to
recover the fumble. Minimum standards for all Florida schools must be
established to guarantee that no child is deprived the opportunity to
obtain an adequate education.
Gary E. Sherman*
Attorney: "According to the minimum requirements which have been set
up by the State Board of Education . . ., anyone attending a non-public
school complies with compulsory attendance laws ...by attending for
180 school days. They do not establish the curriculum or that the teachers
have to be certified."
Judge: "What does your position do with the supposed legislative intention
that we shall have compulsory education in this state? Devastates it, does
it not?"
Attorney: "Compulsory attendance may be achieved in one of four ways.
Number 3 is private school."
Judge: "You need not have a teacher and you need not educate!"
Attorney: "No Sir, it is the legislature that has dropped the ball if.any-
body, not this court or not the lower court. The lower court can only rule
by what the law is as we find it."
115. State of Fla. v. M.M.-(oral argument tape).
* I would like to express my appreciation to Special Assistant Attorney General
Paul Zachs and attorney Ellis Rubin for their cooperation during my research. I would
also like to express a special thank-you to Edna Sherman for her effort in typing this
note.
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